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TAGS: [OSCE](#) [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [PGOV](#) [KZ](#)
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: FOREIGN MINISTER KEEPS COURSE FOR 2009
OSCE CIO

Classified By: DCM Kevin Milas; Reasons 1.5(b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: On October 23, Foreign Minister Tokayev told Ambassador Ordway that the GOK would not accept the OSCE CIO compromise laid out in the October 4 USG "non paper." The existence of "pre-conditions" to the Kazakhstani chairmanship, he said, "would embarrass us." Tokayev informed the Ambassador that he intended to address the non-paper proposal in his October 27 speech to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna. The GOK, Tokayev said, "would continue to insist" on the 2009 chairmanship. However, he added, if no consensus on the issue could be achieved during the December OSCE Ministerial, the GOK would prefer that a decision be postponed until 2007, when Kazakhstan's political reforms could once again be evaluated. In explaining the GOK resolve to press forward with its 2009 bid, Tokayev emphasized that, of the OSCE countries, "only the U.S." had proposed 2011 as an alternative. End Summary.

Non-Paper Approach "Embarrassing" to Kazakhstan

¶2. (C) Asked by Ambassador Ordway for the GOK's views on the USG non-paper on Kazakhstan's OSCE CIO candidacy (delivered to the Kazakhstani Embassy in Washington on October 4), Tokayev told the Ambassador that the "memo was taken very seriously, but to us it isn't a case of implementing benchmarks." He termed the proposal that Kazakhstan would delay its CIO bid until 2011, with OSCE member support conditional upon GOK implementation of agreed-upon democratic reforms, "unacceptable to Kazakhstan...preconditions would embarrass us."

¶3. (C) Ambassador Ordway told Tokayev that his main concern was not to debate Tokayev on the CIO issue, but rather to understand and convey the GOK's position to Washington. However, he emphasized, the non-paper proposals for democratic reform had been taken from Deputy Foreign Minister Aliyev's own remarks. Thus, the USG was not attempting to impose benchmarks, but rather to react to, and even accept, what the GOK itself had proposed.

Tokayev: "Only the U.S." Has Proposed 2011

¶4. (C) Several times during the conversation Tokayev reiterated that Kazakhstan's bid had the support of a "majority" of OSCE members, even an "overwhelming" majority. "We have no right to reject the support of the countries that have offered it," he said, and "we still believe Kazakhstan deserves to be supported in 2009." The Executive Secretariat

of the CIS, he mentioned, would "make another appeal in December" supporting Kazakhstan's candidacy. Tokayev also emphasized that "only the U.S." had proposed 2011 as an alternative to 2009. "No other OSCE country has done so," he observed. Summing up the GOK position, Tokayev said that "there is no reason for us to renounce our application (for the 2009 CiO)."

Tokayev to Address Non-Paper in Vienna

15. (C) Tokayev informed the Ambassador "in a friendly way" that he intended to "address" the non-paper proposal in his October 27th address to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna. (Note: Tokayev plans to depart Kazakhstan for Vienna on October 26. End Note.)

December OSCE Ministerial: Better to Defer than Disagree?

16. (C) Tokayev acknowledged that, despite what he termed "overwhelming" OSCE-member support for Kazakhstan's 2009 bid, OSCE rules made it clear that "we need a consensus" to resolve the issue. At the December OSCE Ministerial meeting, he said, there would be "only two options -- 2009 and 2011." While the GOK would "continue to insist" on 2009, he explained, if no consensus could be reached, "the whole issue can be postponed until 2007," at which time a final decision could be made based on an evaluation of Kazakhstan's intervening progress on political reform. In the case of continued opposition to Kazakhstan's candidacy, he concluded, "the best decision is no decision."

GOK Will Not Veto Another Country's Candidacy

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17. (C) Tokayev mentioned that the GOK "had heard of" Greece's possible candidacy for the 2009 CiO. That proposal "wouldn't be so good," Tokayev remarked, citing the fact that Greece had not mounted a campaign for the CiO. However, although the GOK had the right to block any country's candidacy, he said, we "won't do it." On the CiO issue, Tokayev reported to Ambassador Ordway, he had told Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht that "we are not interested in creating fault lines" within the OSCE.

Affirming the Need to Implement Political Reform

18. (C) Tokayev affirmed that, notwithstanding the GOK objection to preconditions to its CiO bid, "we strongly believe we have to make progress in political reforms." Toward that end, President Nazarbayev would make a "special statement" on democratic reform, perhaps early in 2007. At roughly the same time, the GOK would begin to undertake reforms, to include "changing the role of Parliament," and "changing the function of Deputies."

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